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Abstract 
The purpose of this research was to develop a technology to quickly identify 
hidden explosive materials.  The developed method needs to be performed at a standoff 
distance of approximately two meters or more, must have high sensitivity (low false-
negative rate) and good specificity (low false-positive rate), and should be able to detect a 
minimum amount of approximately one gallon (15 lbs) of explosive material.   
In an effort to meet these goals, a template-matching procedure to aid in the rapid 
detection of hidden improvised explosive devices was investigated.  Multiple photon-
scattered responses are being used as a part of a multidimensional signature-based 
radiation scanning (SBRS) approach in an attempt to detect chemical explosives at safe, 
standoff distances.  The SBRS approach utilizes both neutron and photon interrogation to 
determine if a target contains explosive material, but the focus of this thesis is on photon 
interrogation. 
Beams of photons are used to create back-streamed responses called signatures, 
which are dependent on the density and the composition of the target.  These signatures 
are compared to templates, which are collections of the same signatures if the 
interrogated volume contained a significant amount of explosives.  The signature analysis 
produces a single figure-of-merit.  A low figure-of-merit indicates an explosive might be 
present in the target.  Experiments have been conducted that show an explosive surrogate 
(fertilizer) can be distinguished from several inert materials using these photon 
signatures, proving these signatures to be very useful in this particular method of 
chemical explosive detection.   
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CHAPTER 1 - Introduction 
1.1  The Problem  
The continuous growth of international travel and trade has led to an increase in 
the smuggling of weapons and illicit drugs. Over the past decade an increase in terrorist 
attacks and the placement of hidden explosives in aircraft, transport vehicles, and public 
places has taken place.  Detection of hidden explosives has become extremely important 
due to the increasing use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by terrorists.  An IED is 
by definition a bomb constructed and deployed in ways other than conventional military 
actions.  IEDs are typically fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, 
lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and are designed to destroy or 
incapacitate personnel or vehicles.  The majority of IEDs use conventional explosive 
material as their explosive load. IEDs are being used extensively against United States 
Military Forces and have been the cause of nearly 40% of all U.S. casualties during 
conflicts in the Middle East. IEDs are extremely diverse in design and are becoming 
increasingly sophisticated, making them difficult to detect.  Several technologies have 
been explored to detect IEDs, but improved methods are still needed. 
 
1.2  Prior Explosive Detection Techniques 
The diversity of explosive formulations makes detection of explosives based on 
their chemical characteristics a challenge, but detecting hidden explosives from standoff 
distances of several meters or more is even more challenging.  Previous and current 
explosive detection techniques have included a variety of methods, such as vapor 
detection, trained sniffer dogs, and several radiation interrogation techniques.  The 
problem with many techniques is that they require a sample to be acquired at or near the 
target, which in turn puts individuals in danger.   
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1.2.1 Trace Detection Methods 
Trace detection methods typically require a sample be taken near the 
target, since only trace quantities are being measured.  Trace detection refers to 
both vapor and particulate sampling of the explosive.  Trace detection equipment 
is passive in that it only detects the vapors or microscopic particles emitted from 
the explosives, as opposed to an active interrogator which typically uses a source 
of radiation to stimulate a response from explosives.  Many common explosives 
have very low vapor pressures making the detection of explosive vapors difficult.  
Several trace detection methods are being explored; here is a brief description of 
some: 
 
Chemiluminescence:  Chemiluminescence is the emission of light as a result of a 
chemical reaction with limited emission of heat.  This method is most commonly 
used to take evidence of blood; the sample glows upon contact with iron.  The 
explosive detection principle is based on the detection of infrared light emitted 
from electronically excited nitrogen dioxide (NO2).  The reaction of nitric oxide 
(NO) with ozone (O3) results in the excited NO2.  A chemiluminescence detector 
consists of an evacuated reaction chamber and a photomultiplier tube situated 
behind a red light filter.  The photomultiplier tube detects the infrared light 
emitted from the NO2 , with the red filter being used to block any light with 
spectral frequency higher than then near infrared.  The amount of NO present in 
the reaction chamber is directly proportional to the signal output from the 
photomultiplier tube.  It is this signal that is used to detect the presence of 
explosives in a chemiluminescence system.  Another technology, usually gas 
chromatography, needs to be used before the chemiluminescence detector to 
separate the explosive compounds for proper identification because the 
chemiluminescence detector alone is not explosive-type specific.  
Chemiluminescence has its advantages in that it can detect a wide range of 
explosives, no radioactive source is required for operation, and when coupled 
with other technologies, has very good sensitivity and selectivity.  However, the 
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chemiluminescence technology is typically higher in cost than other explosive 
detection technologies [1]. 
 
Desorption Electrospray Ionization (DESI):   DESI is a method for creating 
ions that can be used in mass spectrometry for chemical analysis of a substance.  
Many explosive agents and chemical warfare stimulants have been successfully 
ionized using DESI.  During explosive detection, DESI is carried out by directing 
electrosprayed charged droplets and ions of solvent onto a surface.  The result of 
the charged particles on the surface will be the production of gaseous ions of 
material originally present on the surface.  The ions can then be sampled with a 
ion trap mass spectrometer [2].  
 
Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS):  IMS is the process of detecting and 
identifying very low concentrations of chemicals based upon the differential 
migration of gas phase ions through a homogeneous electric field.  A 
conventional ion mobility spectrometer consists of two main regions: a reaction 
region and a drift region.  A collision of beta particles from a weak nickel-63 
(63Ni) source with nitrogen and oxygen ionizes the atmospheric pressure carrier 
gas (usually clean dry air) in the reaction region.  Then, the explosive molecule 
will undergo ion/molecule reactions with the reactant ions.  A mixture of reactant 
and product ions, under the influence of an electric field, reaches a shutter grid 
that separates the reaction region and the drift region.  The ions are attracted to the 
gating grid and lose their charge due to the applied voltage bias.  The grid bias is 
briefly turned off causing the ions to be transmitted into the drift region of the 
cell.  The time required for ions of specific explosives to drift down the IMS tube 
are precisely known and are programmed into the IMS explosive detection 
system’s microprocessor.  Therefore, detecting the presence of explosive 
molecule ions is made possible as the microprocessor monitors the collector 
electrode signal at the programmed drift times [1].   
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Field Ion Spectrometry (FIS):  Known as transverse field compensation ion 
mobility spectrometry, FIS is a new technique for trace gas analysis.  Its principle 
is based on filtering ion species according to the functional dependence of their 
mobilities with electric field strength.  FIS has been developed for trace detection 
of explosives, narcotics, and chemical warfare agents.  This technology is quite 
similar to IMS in that it separates and quantifies ions while they are carried in a 
gas at atmospheric pressure.  During operation, the sensor’s ionizing cavity draws 
in the air sample to be analyzed.  Once ionized and electrically separated from the 
bulk sample, the ions are carried through the spectrometer by a steady flow of 
clean dry air.  Then, all ions except those of interest are dispersed to the sensor’s 
walls, permitting only a select group to reach the detector.  In conclusion, the 
detector can be tuned to selectively pass only the ions of interest, making 
detection of explosives and other compounds possible [1]. 
 
Immunoassay and Biosensor Methods:  Immunoassay methods are based on a 
reaction between a target analyte and a specific antibody.  A biochemical test 
measures the concentration of a substance in a biological liquid, using the reaction 
of an antibody to its antigen.  During explosive detection, the sample (explosive), 
an enzyme conjugate of the explosive, and particles with antibodies specific to the 
explosive attached are mixed.  Any explosives that may be in the sample and the 
enzyme conjugate compete for antibody binding sites on the particles.  The 
presence of an explosive can then be detected by adding an enzyme substrate and 
a chromagen, creating a colored product.  Biosensors use antibodies in a similar 
way.  On fiber optic biosensors, when antibodies, immobilized on the fiber 
surface, bind the fluorescently labeled explosive, laser light in the evanescent 
wave excites the fluorophore, generating a signal.  Explosives present in the 
sample prevent such binding and will therefore decrease the signal [2].  
 
Photoluminescence and Semi Conducting Organic Polymers (SOP):  
Photoluminescence is essentially a process in which a substance absorbs photons 
(electromagnetic radiation) and then re-radiates photons.  The use of SOPs allows 
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one to use photoluminescence for explosive detection.  SOPs are electron-rich 
polymers with highly non-linear characteristics, and they bind well with 
molecules that have electronegative sites, such as nitrogen-rich explosives.  When 
using SOPs for explosive detection, one uses a SOP that fluoresces when 
illuminated by ultraviolet light.  Then, when the SOP is exposed to a certain target 
vapor (explosives), the vapor molecules bind to the surface of the SOP, which in 
turn causes a decrease in fluorescence intensity.  This detected decrease in 
intensity indicates the presence of a certain explosive molecule [2]. 
 
The above are just a few of the many trace detection methods available.  
Several others are also being used to detect explosives such as: mass 
spectrometry, surface plasmon resonance (SPR), cavity ringdown spectroscopy 
(CRDS), gas chromatography, and thermo-redox [1,2].  This research aims to find 
a method to detect hidden explosives from safe standoff distances using a 
combination of both photon and neutron interrogation.  To make the proposed 
detection method as successful as possible, it is important to understand what 
previous ionizing radiation interrogation techniques have been investigated.   
 
1.2.2  Neutron Interrogation Techniques 
Neutron interrogation methods generally attempt to identify explosives by 
their stoichiometry by performing a quantitative analysis of the contents of a 
target [3].  Most common explosives are composed primarily of hydrogen (H), 
carbon (C), nitrogen (N), and oxygen (O) and many neutron techniques can be 
applied to detect these HCNO compounds.  Several neutron techniques include 
the following: 
Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA):  Neutrons have excellent penetrating power 
in matter and interact well with nitrogen-rich materials, such as explosives, in a 
well known and predictable way.  Several terms are used to describe the kinetic 
energy of a neutron, such as fast, cold, thermal, epithermal, and so forth.  The 
term thermal neutron refers a neutron that is in thermal equilibrium wit its 
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surroundings.  At standard room temperature, 293 K, the most probable energy of 
a thermal neutron is 0.025 electron volts (eV).  When a thermal neutron penetrates 
an object and is absorbed by a nucleus, a gamma-ray photon can be emitted with 
an energy specific to the atom that absorbed it.  The gamma-ray energies given 
off by atoms that capture thermal neutrons are well known and documented.  
During explosive detection, detecting gamma-ray photons of a known energy 
emitted by nitrogen after thermal neutron absorption indicates the presence of 
nitrogen.  In turn, the number of photons detected is an indication of the amount 
of nitrogen present.  This makes the detection of nitrogen-rich explosives possible 
[4].   
 
Fast Neutron Analysis (FNA):  As previously noted, neutrons have excellent 
penetrating power.  The FNA technique is based on fast neutron interaction with 
matter.  Explosive detection is possible with FNA by the inelastic scattering of 
neutrons with elements such as oxygen, carbon, and nitrogen inside the explosive.  
After one irradiates a target with fast, or high-energy neutrons, the fast neutrons 
can put nuclei of these elements in excited, short lived states.  The nuclei return to 
their initial states by emitting radiation, often gamma-ray photons of specific 
energies determined by the chemical characteristics of the sample.  Detecting 
these characteristic gamma rays makes it possible to estimate how much oxygen, 
carbon, and nitrogen is present with respect to each other.  Determining these 
elemental ratios allows for the determination of the type of substance in the target.  
FNA has an advantage over TNA in that it is sensitive to nearly all elements in 
explosives, whereas TNA lacks sensitivity to two key elements in explosives, 
carbon and oxygen [5]. 
 
Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis (PFNA):  This technique measures the elemental 
composition of the contents of a scanned target.  The target is scanned with a 
pulsed mono-energetic neutron beam, typically nanoseconds apart. The beam is 
created by a neutron generator, typically a deuterium-tritium (D-T) or deuterium-
deuterium (D-D) reaction producing high-energy neutrons.  The high-energy 
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neutrons interact with elements of the target and create gamma rays with energies 
characteristic of the elements.  The energy and time of arrival of the gamma rays 
in the detectors allows for an elemental image of the target to be created.  At this 
point, software is used to determine the presence of specific combinations of 
elements (elemental ratios), and a characterization of the target material is made 
[6]. 
 
Pulsed fast-thermal neutron activation analysis (PFTNA):  This method is 
rather unique in that it utilizes both TNA and PFNA for explosive detection.  To 
detect explosives using PFTNA, one starts by using a neutron generator to 
irradiate the target sample with microsecond wide fast neutron pulses; typically a 
D-T generator producing 14-MeV neutrons is used.  During these pulses, and 
possibly also shortly thereafter, prompt gamma rays resulting from fast neutron 
inelastic scattering reactions (and nuclear reactions) are measured.  Once the pulse 
is over, the accelerator is briefly turned off, and during this time the neutrons 
which have been thermalised by low atomic mass elements in the target sample 
can interact with elements in the sample.  These interactions produce prompt 
capture gamma rays and can be detected just as in TNA.  The cycle then starts 
over again.  Utilizing both fast and thermal neutron analysis together in this 
method, one can detect characteristic gamma rays of the elements in the sample 
and determine the composition of the target [7]. 
 
Pulsed Fast Neutron Transmission Spectroscopy (PFNTS):  During explosive 
detection using PFNTS, the target must be irradiated with a nanosecond pulsed 
broad energy neutron beam.  This broad energy neutron beam is attenuated in the 
target sample according to the total scattering cross section of each element in the 
sample.  Transmitted neutrons can then be detected by a bank of neutron detectors 
on the far side of the target.  Proper analysis of the transmitted neutron spectra 
allows one to construct a crude map of the elements in the target sample [8]. 
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Associated Particle Imaging (API):  API is a fast neutron reaction imaging 
technique.  In most API systems, a D-T neutron generator is used to create 14-
MeV neutrons.  The target sample is irradiated by this beam of fast neutrons and 
the neutron interaction sites can be imaged.  The interactions create a neutron and 
an alpha particle, which move in opposite directions.  Detecting the alpha particle 
allows the direction and time of emission of the neutron to be known.  The 
neutron will then interact within the sample creating gamma rays to be emitted.  
These gamma rays can then be detected, and by measuring the time between alpha 
detection and gamma detection, one can determine how long the neutron traveled 
before reacting.  One can construct a tally of these interaction sites and an image 
can be created of the sample [9].      
 
Fast Neutron Scattering Analysis (FNSA):  The FNSA technique consists of 
interrogating a target sample with a beam of fast mono-energetic neutrons, 
varying the neutron energy between two chosen values in the range of 3- to 8- 
MeV.  The concept relies on detecting scattered neutrons at both forward and 
backward angles.  In general, one can relate the detector measurements to material 
composition using known relationships between the scattering angle and the 
scattered neutron energy [10]. 
 
The above summary covered many of the neutron interrogation techniques 
currently used to detect hidden explosives, however, more technologies exist and 
more are still being developed.  While neutron techniques can be effective in 
principle, in practice they still have some disadvantages.  Photon interrogation 
techniques will be considered next. 
 
1.2.3 Photon Interrogation Techniques 
It is important to note at this point that both the neutron interrogation 
methods previously described and the photon interrogation methods about to be 
described are not necessarily “explosive detectors” within themselves, but rather 
 8
they are techniques that detect materials that have explosive-like characteristics.  
In this research, the method being utilized and described later is no different in 
that it uses a library of templates that are characteristic to that of an explosive to 
discriminate explosive materials from inert ones.  Almost all traditional photon 
interrogation techniques make use of x rays, often times to create an image of the 
target sample.  Explosives have unique x-ray interaction characteristics as 
compared to inert materials with similar elemental composition.  Detecting and 
measuring these unique interactions can be used to identify explosives.  Some 
common x-ray technologies include the following: 
 
X-ray Transmission Radiography:  One of the most widespread x-ray 
techniques used today involves x-ray transmission.  The technique uses a beam of 
x rays penetrating the target sample to obtain an image.  An x-ray beam that 
penetrates the target is attenuated by all objects and materials in its beam path and 
makes one compound image out of anything in its line-of-sight.  It becomes 
difficult to separate the image of one object to another as more objects are added 
to the x-ray’s beam path.  This becomes particularly difficult when the target 
sample under investigation does not transmit or absorb x rays very well, i.e. low-
atomic-number (low-Z) organics such as explosives, drugs, and plastic weapons.  
Dual-energy transmission systems have an advantage over single-energy systems 
in that material discrimination is achieved by comparing the attenuation ratio of 
low-energy x rays to high-energy x rays.  Dual energies of around 75-keVand 
150-keV are used to attempt to image low-Z organics; however, if the background 
is cluttered, the system is relatively ineffective [1]. 
 
Backscatter X-ray Radiography:  In contrast to the traditional x-ray 
transmission technique, which detects high and low-Z materials by the variation 
in transmission through the target, backscatter x-ray radiography is a newer 
imaging system that detects the radiation which comes back from the target.  
Low-Z and high-Z materials are distinguished by their radiation scattering 
characteristics.  Low-Z objects such as explosives, drugs, plastic weapons, and 
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other organic materials that typically appear low in contrast in conventional x-ray 
systems, appear bright white.  However, detection becomes difficult if extremely 
dense materials are present inside the target.  Low-Z objects that are behind dense 
material may remain hidden.  AS&E has commercialized this technology and 
have developed what they call the Z-backscatter van.  The van is a mobile 
imaging system that can interrogate objects, either stationary or at moderate 
speeds, and create a backscattered image of the target, as shown in Figure 1.1 
[11]. 
Figure 1.1  Backscatter image taken from AS&E Z-Backscatter Van 
 
 
The image above is an example of how well backscatter imaging can work.  
However, while the image is quite useful, it measures primarily density variation 
at high spatial resolution with minimal information of composition.  Moreover, 
the image must be interpreted. 
 
Computed Tomography (CT):  This method uses digital geometry processing to 
generate a two-dimensional image of a slice of the inside of an object.  Three-
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dimensional images can be obtained from a large series of two-dimensional x-ray 
images taken around a single axis of rotation.  An x-ray beam penetrates the target 
and produces two-dimensional images of cross-sectional slices of an object.  The 
three-dimensional image can then be obtained by appropriately combining a 
number of adjacent cross-sectional slices.  CT has advantages over other imaging 
techniques in that it can provide very high spatial resolution and good contrast.  
Hence, it is useful for material detection and identification, and can be used to 
specifically identify explosives and discriminate them from most other inert, low-
Z materials.  However, while this method is quite effective, it requires that 
projections be collected from many different directions in order to create an 
accurate image [1]. 
 
Photon interrogation techniques, mainly x-ray imaging, to detect hidden 
explosives are some of the most frequently used methods currently being 
exercised.  The major advantage of imaging techniques is good image resolution.  
However, x rays have a small interaction cross section with low-Z elements, and 
many organic materials such as explosive compounds and illicit drugs are 
composed of these low-Z elements, making discrimination between explosive and 
background items difficult.  In addition, health risks associated with x-ray 
techniques must be considered. 
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CHAPTER 2 - Theory 
2.1  Explosive Composition 
Common nitrogen-rich explosives have a substantially larger ratio of nitrogen (N) 
to hydrogen (H), as well as a larger ratio of oxygen (O) to carbon (C), than most inert 
materials containing these same elements.  The majority of these explosives can be 
characterized by a composition of about 31% nitrogen (N), 3 % hydrogen (H), 46% 
oxygen (O), and 20% carbon (C) [12].  The chart below gives a comparison of the 
amounts of H, C, N, and O in several common explosives to many common inert 
substances. 
Figure 2.1  Atomic fractions of the elements H,C,N,O which constitute a selection of 
explosives, illicit drugs, and miscellaneous common substances [3]. 
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As seen from Figure 2.1, nitrogen and oxygen are the primary constituents of 
many HCNO explosive compounds.  Most nitrogen base explosives have a nitrogen 
content of 31 ± 12%, with an oxygen content of 45 ± 8% [12].  The presence of over 
approximately 30% nitrogen and 40% oxygen in any HCNO compound almost always 
indicates the compound is unstable. Densities of explosives are typically over 50% higher 
than densities of common HCNO compounds.  Similarly, other heavy materials such as 
metals contain elements of higher atomic number and in turn have higher densities than 
either explosives or common HCNO inert materials.  It thus seems reasonable that it is 
possible to detect a significant amount of explosives in a target sample based on the 
presence and amount of these characteristic elements (HCNO), and the differences in 
densities and composition between explosives and common HCNO inert materials.   
 
2.2  Photon Interrogation Technique 
Many traditional approaches to detecting hidden chemical explosives with 
photons involve radiographic imaging techniques.  Conventional radiographic systems 
that attempt to detect explosives or contraband by the use photons in the form of x rays 
are not sufficient.  The probability of photoelectric absorption per atom behaves 
approximately as: 
                                                             3E
Z n=τ                                                            (1)      
where Z is the atomic number of the atom, E is the photon energy, and the exponent n 
varies between 3 for low-energy photons to 5 for high-energy photons.  Therefore, the 
low Z-number of nitrogen-based explosives makes it difficult to distinguish them from 
other common materials using the photoelectric effect, on which conventional 
radiography relies [14]. 
Gamma interrogation can be used to find the density and, to some extent, the 
composition of a target.  This technique has already been used for some time in soil 
sciences and the petroleum industry. Gamma-ray backscatter density gauges use the 
Compton scattering and photoelectric absorption of gamma-ray photons in materials to 
measure density and composition.   
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This approach can also be used to help detect hidden explosives by identifying the 
differences in photon signatures caused by the variations in density and composition 
between an explosive and an inert material.  The source bombards the target with photons 
while the detector counts the number of backscattered photons over a wide energy range.  
The backscattered response essentially depends on the competition between photoelectric 
absorption and Compton scattering. The photoelectric cross-section increases with the 
atomic number of the object, while the Compton cross-section is relatively independent 
of the atomic number [16]. Therefore, the resulting backscattered response will favor low 
Z-elements of high density, such as many conventional explosives, and provide a method 
of detecting the differences in density, and somewhat composition, between explosive 
and inert materials.   
The SBRS method being investigated will use multiple responses from back-
streaming radiation consisting of scattered radiation and possibly 0.511-MeV photons 
from photon-induced positron annihilation radiation (PIPAR) as well to detect IEDs [17].  
The back-streamed responses are functions not just of density (ρ), but also of average 
Compton (σC), photoelectric (σpe), and pair-production (σpp) cross sections.  Pair-
production occurs only when the incident gamma-ray energy is over 1.022-MeV.  
Interrogating a target volume will produce detector responses that are functions of some 
or all of these variables.  Detecting the presence of an explosive is made possible by the 
proper analysis of these detector responses from back-streaming radiation. 
 Proper analysis of back-streamed detector responses is the cornerstone of the 
SBRS approach.  The back-streamed photon interrogation responses essentially 
determine differences in densities, and approximate composition, of unknown targets. To 
accurately determine these differences and/or similarities among unknown material 
densities and compositions, one must have an idea of what energy range the majority of 
these back-streamed photons will appear in.  The majority of the back-streamed photons 
seen by the detector in the proposed approach are Compton-scattered photons.  The 
Compton formula is as follows, 
                                               
( )s
ecm
E
EE
ϑcos11 2 −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+
=′                                             (2) 
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where E is the initial photon energy, E ′  is the scattered photon energy, sϑcos  is the 
photon scattering angle, and  is rest-mass energy of the free electron with which the 
incident photon collides [18].  With this formula, one can calculate the appropriate 
energies of the Compton-scattered photons that comprise the back-streamed responses if 
the initial energy of the photons interrogating the target is known, as well as the single-
scatter angle, which is determined by the placement of the source and detector.  Once the 
range of energies that the back-streamed photons appears in is known, one can then 
integrate the response over this range and construct the response of the unknown target.  
The response is then ready to be properly analyzed.  
2cme
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CHAPTER 3 - Analysis 
3.1  Signature-Based Radiation Scanning 
It is possible to detect the presence of explosives by analyzing detector responses 
from back-streaming radiation from interrogated target volumes.  Active interrogation 
methods such as signature-based radiation scanning (SBRS) have advantages over 
passive approaches when attempting standoff explosive detection [15].  Much research is 
being conducted on detecting explosives, more importantly IEDs, by using active 
interrogation techniques with ionizing radiation.  The difference in these techniques is 
how the target volume is interrogated and how the radiation responses are analyzed.   
SBRS advantageous compared not only to passive techniques, but also to other 
active ionizing radiation methods such as imaging [15].  The method utilizes simple 
template matching from multi-dimensional information on the target as opposed to 
imaging methods that require very high spatial resolution.  The SBRS method is a 
radiation-based method that can be used to detect hidden explosives by analyzing 
multiple radiation-induced signatures that depend on several sample variables within an 
interrogated volume.  Typical interrogated volumes are on the order of several hundred 
cm3 or larger, making spatial resolution much poorer than that for imaging techniques.  
However, the high resolution is not needed and the signal in this case contains much 
more information about the target. 
The SBRS technique uses combinations of neutron and photon beams to actively 
interrogate a target volume.  Use of neutron and photon radiation interrogation together 
provides more information about the target than the use of either individually.  Radiation 
detectors record back-streaming radiation, i.e. back-scattered photons, back-scattered 
neutrons, prompt and inelastic-scattered gamma rays, and possibly even photon-induced 
positron annihilation radiation (PIPAR) [13].  The technique requires scanning the target 
volume in steps, recording back-streamed radiation responses at each step.  These 
responses are not used to attempt creating an image of the target sample, but rather to use 
these responses for a comparison to responses from known samples.  An array of detector 
responses R is collected from an unknown target.  The array of responses is then 
compared with an explosive template S.  The explosive template S is an array of detector 
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responses of a target in a geometric configuration known to contain explosive material.  
A database of explosive templates of different explosive types, different target types, in 
different geometric configurations can be created.  One can then differentiate between 
targets that contain explosives and those that do not by comparing the responses from the 
unknown target to the library of explosive templates to construct a single figure-of-merit 
metric. 
 
3.2 Figure-of-Merit Analysis 
As mentioned before, the main difference between most active radiation 
interrogation techniques is the way in which the detector responses are analyzed.  Many 
techniques use inversion methods to solve for the sample variables that are being sought.  
This involves creating mathematical models for the detector responses in terms of the 
target sample parameters, and then inverting the model to obtain estimates of the 
parameters.  Depending on the complexity of the model, this inversion can be either 
analytic or numeric.  However, with the SBRS approach, the inversion of mathematical 
models to obtain sample parameters such as density or composition is not necessary.  It is 
possible to detect explosives using the SBRS method that utilizes a template-matching 
signature analysis.  One can certainly solve the model equations to obtain estimates of the 
sample parameters.  However, the parameters will have uncertainties associated with 
them since the measured responses themselves are uncertain.  In turn, the process of 
comparing the measured parameter estimates to the desired characteristic will be subject 
to these uncertainties. 
A template-matching technique is used here that compares a vector R of detector 
responses from an unknown target to a template S, which is a vector of detector responses 
from a similar target that is known to have explosives present. One can essentially detect 
the presence of a chemical explosive by creating a database of templates of different 
target types and geometric configurations that are known to have explosives present and 
comparing the response vector R for the specific target type to the appropriate templates.   
Multiple photon beams of different energies can be used to interrogate a target 
from a safe, standoff distance. This will in turn create multiple back-streamed radiation 
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responses that can be detected.  For each target type, some number L of templates can be 
constructed.  If an explosive were present in a known configuration , then each template 
 is the vector of N values of expected responses.  One then obtains 
a response vector 
A
( 1 2, , , NS S S=SA A A … )A
)( 1 2, , , NR R R…=R of N back-streamed responses by interrogating an 
unknown target in a similar manner.  The template-matching procedure can then be 
applied.  This procedure produces a chi-square-like figure-of-merit 
                                   ( )( ) ( )
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 with wi being a non-negative weight for the ith signature.  The parameter β is a factor that 
scales the measured signatures to the templates, and σ2 is the variance in the measured 
responses [19].  For any value of , a A Aζ  value less than a cut-off value, established by 
the user, indicates that an explosive is suspected.  The cut-off value selected by the user 
can be modified to adjust the sensitivity and the specificity of this analysis method.      
The figure-of-merit calculation has with it some uncertainty.  The standard 
deviation of the figure-of-merit is given by [19]:  
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This calculation of uncertainty is used as part of the final analysis to determine if an 
unknown target sample contains explosives.  After the response vector R from the 
unknown target has been constructed, the figures-of-merit Aζ  have been calculated, the 
standard deviations of the figures-of-merit ( )lζσ  have been calculated, and a cut-off 
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value  has been selected, one can then proceed toward the final analysis of 
discriminating explosives from inert materials. 
0f
 It seems reasonable to reduce the large universe of targets into the few that are 
explosive, the many that are safe, and a small percentage that still are suspect. The 
filtering calculation is the last step in determining if an unknown target sample contains 
explosives.  This filtering calculation will determine if a suspect target is benign, which is 
designated the “green” zone; is explosive, which is called the “red” zone; or requires 
further examination, which is designated as the “yellow” zone.  The first step is to 
calculate the f-minus function:  
                                                    ( ) ( )ζσλζλ −−− −=f .                                                    (6)             
The user can then choose a specified cut-off value  as well as a value for λ.  The 
parameter λ is adjustable and is chosen based on the confidence level one desires.  If 
0f
( ) 0f −− f>λ  for all templates, then the target is considered clearly benign (green zone).  
If ( )−λ−f  fails to fall in the green zone, then one proceeds to calculate f-plus as: 
                                                    ( ) ( )ζσλζλ +++ +=f .                                                    (8) 
( )+ 0ff <+ λIf  , then the target is considered clearly an explosive (red zone).  If ( )++ λf  
fails to fall in the red zone, then it is uncertain if the target is explosive or inert and the 
target falls into the “yellow” zone.  If a target falls into the “yellow” zone, further 
examination is necessary, where adjustment to the cut-off value  is a possible solution.   0f
 The selection of values for  and 0f ±λ  is determined by the researcher, based on 
the sensitivity and specificity of the system and the confidence level that he or she seeks.  
As mentioned before, the objective is to identify as many true explosives as possible and 
as many true inert targets as possible, thereby minimizing the number of suspect targets.  
The higher the values chosen for ±λ , the higher the confidence in the system.  For a 
normal distribution, choosing λ = 1 implies 68% confidence, choosing λ = 2 implies 95% 
confidence, and choosing λ = 3 implies 99% confidence, for either +λ  or −λ . The figure-
of-merit equation used in this analysis has a chi-square like distribution, therefore to state 
that λ = 1 implies 68% confidence, λ = 2 implies 95% confidence, and choosing λ = 3 
implies 99% confidence is a crude assumption.  The point to be made is that the higher 
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the value chosen for lambda, the more confident the user is in the analysis. One could 
choose −λ  = 1 or 2 for good specificity (low false-positive rate) when comparing ( )−− λf , 
or one could choose +λ  = 3 for good sensitivity (low false-negative rate) when 
comparing ( )++ λf .  For example, one chooses a cut-off value of = 20 and chooses λ 
=
0f
+λ = −λ = 3 for good sensitivity and good specificity.  The user then calculates a figure-
of-merit value of ζ = 40 and a standard deviation of ( )ζσ = 5.  Using the first filter to see 
if the target is benign one finds:  
                                                   ( ) 5340 25=×−=−− λf                                                (10) 
It is clear to see tha 0t ( ) 2>−− λf
nig
. Therefore, it is presumed, at the 99%  confidence 
level, that the target is be n. 
 
3.3 Advantages of SBRS 
 The SBRS approach to detecting hidden explosives is believed to have its 
advantages over both passive and other active interrogation methods. The SBRS 
approach simply seeks detection of hidden explosives and does not attempt to measure 
the composition of the contents of a target.  The contents of a target sample are of no 
concern if they do not represent an explosive.  Trading spatial resolution for multi-
dimensional signature analysis, and the complexity of image analysis for the simplicity of 
template-matching, simplifies the process and allows for a quick, real-time interrogation 
and analysis.   
The SBRS method outputs a simple yes/no result on the basis of a few figure-of-
merit metrics without human interpretation being required.  Human interpretation by a 
trained operator is only required when a target falls within the “yellow” zone. At this 
point further evaluation of the target may be necessary. 
The SBRS procedure contains interrogation devices that can be operated remotely 
and from a safe standoff distance so no human operator is put in jeopardy during 
interrogation.  Also, the components operate at standoff distances of a few meters.  Thus, 
this method could be used for early interrogation as part of a tiered detection approach 
where targets with figures-of-merit below a certain cut-off would be assumed to contain 
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explosives while other targets could be classified as either safe or uncertain and require 
further investigation. 
 The results of this approach are based on the cumulative effect of many 
signatures with clutter present.  It is recognized that problems associated with clutter 
cannot be eliminated, but they can be reduced by focusing on appropriately sized 
volumes, coupled with the fact that one is simply trying to determine if the signatures for 
any interrogated volume closely match any templates of an explosive material being in 
that volume.  By “scanning” a target in a linear or raster-like fashion simplifies the 
procedure and allows one to try to detect if an explosive is present, not measure or image 
the contents of a target.  
Lastly, new signatures can be added to this procedure at any time, making it very 
adaptive. We are initially investigating radiation induced signatures, but as new 
signatures become available they can easily become incorporated into the analysis. 
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CHAPTER 4 - Experimental Procedure 
4.1 Equipment 
The photon back-streaming experiments were conducted in the Standoff Bomb 
Detection Laboratory  located in room 9 of Ward Hall at Kansas State University.  The 
experiments required the use of the following: 
Source:  US Nuclear J-203 OCD Cobalt-60 (60Co) cylindrical tube source with current 
activity 0.0687 Ci.  60Co emits both 1.173 MeV and 1.332 MeV gamma-ray photons. 
Shielding/Collimation:  2×4×8 inch lead bricks were used to construct a small box with 
a 2-inch square hole on one side to serve as a collimator.  The box was then surrounded 
on the three solid sides with more lead bricks creating approximately 12 inches of 
shielding on each side.  For some experiments a lead container with an approximately 2-
inch square hole was used. 
Target:  Two targets were used for the experiments.  The target used in the first 
experiment was an aluminum box.  The box was constructed out of 1.588-mm (0.0625-
in.) thick sheet aluminum, and is held together with screwed on angle supports.  The box 
measures approximately 0.5 meters (20 inches) on each side with a removable lid.  Inside 
the box, a wooden platform sitting on adjustable Unistrut angle supports was constructed 
to raise the samples to the appropriate height of the beam.  The second target is a large 
suitcase in to which one-gallon paint cans comfortably fit.   
Samples:  One-gallon paint cans were filled with explosive surrogates and various inert 
materials.  Four explosive surrogates were used: Ammonium Nitrate, a 30% nitrogen 
fertilizer which was referred to as FertA, a 36% fertilizer which was referred to as FertB, 
and a 50/50 mixture of FertA and FertB which was called FertAB.  The various inert 
materials consisted of aluminum, chalk, polyethylene, rubber, sand, water, and air (empty 
paint can).  
Computer:  A Gateway personal laptop with Genie 2000 version 3.1 installed was used. 
Genie 2000 is a gamma-acquisition software with many powerful tools that allows the 
user to analyze the spectrum. 
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Detection System:  The gamma-ray photon detector used to collect the back-streamed 
spectra was a Canberra 3x3 inch sodium-iodide-thallium-activated scintillation detector, 
NaI(Tl), model 3M3/3-X.  The detector was connected to a Canberra UniSpec, serial 
number 11040113.  The UniSpec, which connects to a computer through a USB 
connection, serves as a multichannel analyzer and also provides high voltage to the 
detector. 
4.2  Experimental Setup 
The setup of the equipment is an essential part to the SBRS active interrogation 
approach.  The idea behind SBRS is to interrogate a target from a safe, standoff distance 
and collect back-streaming radiation from the target.  Collecting back-streaming photons 
in an accurate and efficient way is made possible by the proper placement of the source 
and detector relative to the target.  The setup of the equipment for the photon back-
streaming experiments was the same each time.  The target is placed so that the center of 
the target sample is two meters from the source.  The collimated source of photons has a 
beam width of approximately 8 inches when it hits the target.  The scintillation detector is 
placed one meter from the source and is oriented so that the front of the detector is facing 
the center of the target.  The detector collects back-streamed photons which creates a 
spectrum on the computer screen. The collected back-streamed spectrum can then be 
integrated over a certain energy range and analyzed, providing one with a specific 
signature based on back-streamed photons. Figure 4.1 gives a schematic of the 
experimental layout. 
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Figure 4.1 Schematic of experimental setup with radioactive source irradiating 
target with unknown contents. The scintillation detector is collecting back-streamed 
photons. 
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CHAPTER 5 - Results 
Before any experimentation was conducted, several simulations were run using 
the Monte Carlo Neutral-Particle transport code (MCNP) to help determine if the SBRS 
approach has merit [17].  These simulation results show that by interrogation of an object 
with high-energy photons one can utilize the 0.511 MeV annihilation photons from 
PIPAR to create a particular signature.  This signature is one of many that aid in the 
detection of hidden explosives in the overall SBRS approach.  These encouraging results 
led the research team to believe that making use of the low-energy Compton-scattered 
photons from a target can also be used to create another photon signature.  As mentioned 
before, integrating and analyzing the proper energy range of the back-streamed spectrum 
created by Compton-scattered photons is absolutely essential and is the main focus of this 
research.  This was facilitated by use of the Compton formula as well as many 
repeatability studies to determine if the experimental results were accurate. 
Knowing the initial energy of the incident photon, one can calculate 
approximately what energy the scattered photon will have.  60Co was the radioisotope 
used in the back-streaming experiments.  60Co emits both 1.173-MeV and 1.332-MeV 
gamma-ray photons, giving an average energy of approximately 1.25-MeV. Based on the 
placement of the scintillation detector, one can calculate the single-scatter angle of a 
source photon to reach the detector. This was calculated to be 153.4 degrees or 2.68 
radians.  Plugging these values into the Compton formula of Equation 2 yields: 
                                  ( ) ( )[ ] 222.068.2cos1511.025.11
25.1 =−+=′E MeV.                         (11) 
Thus, a photon with initial energy of 1.25 MeV will have approximately an energy of 
0.222 MeV if it scatters through an angle of about 155 degrees.  However, many photons 
will scatter multiple times within the target medium before reaching the detector, giving 
these photons even lower energies.  To ensure accurate results, one wants to integrate the 
spectrum obtained by the detector over the proper energy range before performing the 
signature analysis on the data.  Thus, the energy range that was decided upon was 75 to 
250 keV.  Integrating from 75 to 250 keV means summing all of the photons in this 
particular energy range to give the user a single value for R.  Many experiments and 
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repeatability studies were performed to confirm that this energy range is an accurate and 
repeatable photon signature.  Figure 5.1 shows an example spectrum taken during a 
photon back-streaming experiment.  The y-axis represents the number of counts while the 
x-axis represents the corresponding energy in keV. 
 
Figure 5.1: Response spectrum taken during photon back-streaming experiment. 
 
 
5.1  Photon Back-Streaming Experiment 1 
Several experiments were conducted throughout the past two years.  One of these 
experiments was conducted to couple the photon experimental data with data from a 
recently conducted neutron experiment.  Three experiments that have taken place over 
roughly an eighteen-month period will be discussed.  The first experiment reported on 
took place on February 21, 2007.  The experimental setup for the experiment follows 
precisely to that of the Figure 4.1.  The parameters for the experiment were as follows: 
Source:  60Co with activity 0.0687 Ci. 
Sample size: 5-gallon 
Irradiation time: 30 minutes per sample 
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Source, sample, and detector height: All at 40 inches from the floor 
Detector: Canberra 3x3 NaI(Tl) scintillation detector with calibration title 
UNI1500.  Details of UNI1500 can be found in Appendix 1. 
Samples used:  3 explosive surrogates: FertA, FertB, and FertAB; 7 inert samples: 
Aluminum, Chalk, Polyethylene, Rubber, Sand, Water, and air 
(empty barrel) 
Outer target:  Aluminum box with adjustable platform 
After each sample had been irradiated for the predetermined time, the back-
streamed spectrum was saved as a text file.  The text file contains a one dimensional 
array of numbers.  Each number is a count associated with a corresponding channel. 
Using the calibration equation associated with the detector, one can convert channel 
number into energy.  This conversion allows the user to integrate counts over a specific 
energy range.  The experiment was conducted over a ten-hour period with no breaks 
except to change each sample.  Each spectrum was integrated from 75 to 250 keV.  The 
response from the FertAB sample was used as the explosive template.  The goal was to 
discriminate the other two explosive surrogates, FertA and FertB, from the seven inert 
materials using FertAB as the template.  For all of the photon experiments discussed here, 
only one photon signature was used (N = 1), the unknown responses were taken for the 
same amount of time as the explosive template making β = 1, and uniform weight factors 
were used making α = 1.  Furthermore, only a single template was obtained in each 
experiment and thus L = 1.  Finally, since each response was obtained by integrating over 
a contiguous energy interval, ( ) RR =2σ  and ( ) SS =2σ .  Therefore, the figure-of-merit 
equation simply reduces to  
                                                       ( )
SR
SR
+
−=
2
ζ  .                                                         (12) 
For example, the user would calculate the figure-of-merit for aluminum in the following 
way: 
                                                  ( ) 104.36
654778661672
654778661672 2 =+
−=ζ .                             (13) 
A table of numerical responses and corresponding standard deviations for each 
experiment can be found in Appendix C.  The results given in Table 5.1 were determined 
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from the experimental data.  It is noted that using Equation (6), it is possible to obtain 
negative values of ( )−− λf
0
.  These should merely be interpreted as indicating an 
explosive, since . 0 >f
 
Table 5.1: Results from photon back-streaming experiment 1 comparing two 
explosive surrogates and six inert materials to fertilizer mix template. 
 
Sample ζ  ( )ζσ  ( )3=− λf  ( )2=− λf  ( )1=− λf  
Aluminum 36.104 12.017 0.052 12.07 24.087 
Chalk 12.922 7.189 -8.646 -1.456 5.733 
Polyethylene 109.613 20.939 46.795 67.735 88.674 
Rubber 5.164 4.545 -8.471 -3.926 0.619 
Sand 42.470 13.034 3.369 16.402 29.436 
Water 12.890 7.181 -8.652 -1.472 5.709 
Air (Empty) 436.052 41.764 310.761 352.524 394.288 
   ( )3=+ λf  ( )2=+ λf  ( )1=+ λf  
FertA 3.791 3.894 15.473 11.579 7.685 
FertB 0.100 0.631 1.993 1.362 0.731 
 
The results show that the explosive surrogates all have lower figure-or-merit 
values than any of the inert materials.  However, to say that one can differentiate all inert 
materials from explosive-like materials with 99% confidence would be incorrect. Both 
polyethylene and air are clearly distinguishable from the explosive surrogates at the 99% 
confidence level, but the remainder of the inert materials are not.  Setting 2λ =
1
 and a 
cut-off value of =12 yields much better results.  At the 95% confidence level one can 
distinguish all but three inert materials from the explosive surrogates.  Setting 
0f
λ =  and a 
cut-off value of =8 does not necessarily improve the results.  The same three inert 
samples (chalk, rubber, and water) still fall below the cut-off value.  While this is not 
ideal, one must keep in mind that this analysis was done using only one photon signature.  
The overall SBRS approach combines both neutron and photon interrogation for a total of 
as many as 10 or more signatures, depending on the number of neutron-induced 
0f
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signatures used.  These results are very encouraging considering only one photon 
signature was used and one can clearly discriminate all but three inert materials from two 
explosive surrogates with 95% confidence. 
5.2  Photon Back-Streaming Experiment 2 
 The second experiment took place on April 4, 2007.  The experimental setup for 
the experiment follows precisely to that of  Figure 4.1.  The parameters for the 
experiment were as follows: 
Source:  60Co with activity 0.0687 Ci. 
Sample size: 5-gallon 
Irradiation time: 60 minutes per sample 
Source, sample, and detector height: All at 48 inches from the floor 
Detector: Canberra 3x3 NaI(Tl) scintillation detector with calibration title 
UNI1500.  Details of UNI1500 can be found in Appendix 1. 
Samples used:  3 explosive surrogates: FertA, FertB, and FertAB; 6 inert samples: 
Aluminum, Chalk, Polyethylene, Rubber, Sand, and Water.  In the 
interest of time, air was left out of the experiments at this point 
since it was always easily distinguishable from the explosive 
surrogates in previous experiments. 
Outer target:  Aluminum box with adjustable platform 
The experiment was conducted over a nine-hour period with no breaks except to 
change each sample.  Once again, each spectrum was integrated from 75 to 250 keV and 
the response from the FertAB explosive surrogate was used as the template.  The only 
difference between this experiment and the first experiment described is the fact that the 
air (or empty barrel) sample was left out.  The results in Table 5.2 were determined from 
the experimental data.  The signatures and standard deviations obtained for this 
experiment are given in Table C.2. 
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Table 5.2:  Results from photon back-streaming experiment 2 comparing two 
explosive surrogates and six inert materials to fertilizer mix template. 
 
Sample ζ  ( )ζσ  ( )3=− λf  ( )2=− λf  ( )1=− λf  
Aluminum 15.127 7.779 -8.209 -0.431 7.348 
Chalk 20.708 9.101 -6.596 2.506 11.607 
Polyethylene 0.721 1.698 -4.373 -2.675 -0.977 
Rubber 57.854 15.212 12.217 27.43 42.642 
Sand 21.542 9.283 -6.306 2.976 12.259 
Water 11.970 6.920 -8.789 -1.87 5.05 
   ( )3=+ λf  ( )2=+ λf  ( )1=+ λf  
FertA 0.451 1.344 4.483 3.139 1.795 
FertB 0.385 1.242 4.111 2.869 1.627 
 
Similar to the previous experiment, all of the inert materials have a higher figure-
of-merit value than the explosive surrogates.  However, one cannot clearly distinguish all 
of the inert materials from the explosive surrogates with 99% or 95% confidence.  Using 
1λ =  and a cut-off value of =5, one can clearly distinguish all but one inert material 
from the explosive surrogates with 68% confidence.  Once again, this is only one photon 
signature, which can be coupled with back-streamed data taken from neutron 
interrogation to improve overall effectiveness.  It is not expected to distinguish all inert 
materials from explosives with 95% confidence using only one photon signature.   
0f
It is important to note that while this experiment was conducted identically to that 
of the first experiment discussed, except for the irradiation time, there are some dramatic 
differences amongst the figure-of-merit values for some samples from one experiment to 
the next.  For example, in experiment 1, polyethylene has a figure-of-merit value of 
109.613 but has a figure-of-merit value of 0.721 in experiment 2.  This can be explained.  
When using the 60Co radioisotope to conduct the photon back-streaming experiments, the 
source had to be transferred from its original containment in the reactor bay and placed 
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inside the collimator in the laboratory.  It was realized after several trials that the smallest 
misplacement of the source before starting the experiment or shifting of the source during 
experimentation can cause dramatic effects on the results.  It was very difficult to place 
the source in the exact same spot inside the collimator for every experiment, thus the 
experimental results differ slightly from one experiment to the next.  The important issue 
is that while source placement causes some variation in the figure-of-merit values from 
one experiment to the next, the same signature (range which was integrated over) was 
still used and reasonable results were achieved. 
 
5.3  Photon Back-Streaming Experiment 3 
The third experiment took place on February 21, 2008.  The experimental setup 
for the experiment follows precisely to that of the Figure 4.1.  The purpose of this 
experiment was to see how much the results changed when using a significantly smaller 
sample size and using a different outer target.  An extra explosive surrogate was also used 
in this experiment.  The parameters for the experiment were as follows: 
Source:  60Co with activity 0.0687 Ci. 
Sample size: 1-gallon 
Irradiation time: 30 minutes per sample 
Source, sample, and detector height: All at 48 inches from the floor 
Detector: Canberra 3x3 NaI(Tl) scintillation detector with calibration title 
UNI1500.  Details of UNI1500 can be found in Appendix 1. 
Samples used:  4 explosive surrogates: Ammonium Nitrate, FertA, FertB, and 
FertAB; 7 inert samples: Aluminum, Chalk, Polyethylene, 
Rubber, Sand, Water, and Air. Air was added back into the 
experiments by this point as someone had inquired about it being 
left out at a conference earlier in the year. 
Outer target:  Large suitcase 
The experiment was conducted over a six-hour period with no breaks except to 
change each sample.  Once again, each spectrum was integrated from 75 to 250 keV and 
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FertAB was the explosive surrogate used as the template.  The following calculations in 
Table 5.3 were made from the experimental data given in Table C.3: 
 
Table 5.3:  Results from photon back-streaming experiment 3 comparing three 
explosive surrogates and seven inert materials to fertilizer mix template. 
 
Sample ζ  ( )ζσ  ( )3=− λf  ( )2=− λf  ( )1=− λf  
Aluminum 0.969 1.969 -4.937 -2.969 -1.0 
Chalk 1.419 2.383 -5.729 -3.347 -.0.964 
Polyethylene 1.450 2.408 -5.774 -3.366 -0.958 
Rubber 8.642 5.879 -8.996 -3.116 2.763 
Sand 23.907 9.779 -5.430 4.349 14.128 
Water 1.796 2.680 -6.245 -3.564 -0.884 
Empty 73.881 17.191 22.309 39.499 56.690 
   ( )3=+ λf  ( )2=+ λf  ( )1=+ λf  
FertA 0.000 0.043 0.130 0.086 0.043 
FertB 0.009 0.188 0.572 0.385 0.197 
AmmNi 0.264 1.028 3.347 2.32 1.292 
 
All of the inert materials have a higher figure-or-merit value than the explosive 
surrogates, which is very encouraging considering this experiment utilizes samples that 
are one-fifth the size of those used in previous experiments, and a new outer target.  As in 
previous experiments, only a couple of inert samples are distinguishable at very high 
confidence levels.  Decreasing the sample size affected the results slightly as not as many 
inert materials are clearly distinguishable at the 68% confidence level as in previous 
experiments.  However, it is encouraging to see these results knowing that the same 
energy range was integrated over, the same samples (just smaller) were used, and the 
outer target was changed from an aluminum box to a suitcase.  Discriminating the 
explosive surrogates from inert materials using only one photon signature is not ideal, but 
the results are very promising and further work is being done to couple the neutron 
interrogation results with the photon interrogation results to see how using multiple 
signatures affects the overall figure-of-merit results [19]. 
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5.4  Photon and Neutron Interrogation Combined 
It was believed that combining photon and neutron interrogation together would 
improve the overall effectiveness of the SBRS approach.  Thus, experimental data from a 
neutron and a photon interrogation experiment were combined to give one combined 
figure-of-merit metric.  The neutron experiment utilized a large aluminum box (about one 
meter on each side), 5-gallon samples, and a windshield placed in front the box to 
simulate a car.  The samples were irradiated by neutrons from the tangential beam tube of 
the Kansas State University TRIGA Mark II reactor.  The photon experiment utilized the 
same setup: large aluminum box, 5-gallon samples, and a windshield in front of the box.  
Again, 60Co was the source used.  Both experiments used FertAB as the explosive 
template.  The back-streamed photon spectra were once again integrated from 75 to 250 
keV to create the photon signatures (see Table C.4).  The detector responses from a bare 
and a cadmium-covered europium doped lithium iodide (LiI(Eu)) neutron detector were 
used as the first two neutron signatures.  The next five signatures came from neutron 
generated gamma-ray responses collected by a 20% efficient high purity germanium 
detector due to the 0.871-MeV nitrogen capture gamma ray, the 2.223-MeV hydrogen 
capture gamma ray, the 4.438-MeV inelastic-scatter gamma ray from carbon, the 4.945-
MeV carbon capture gamma ray, and the 5.105-MeV nitrogen inelastic-scatter gamma 
ray, respectively (see Tables C.5-C11).   
To illustrate how the results improved from using just photon or neutron 
interrogation alone, let us first examine the photon data by itself.  Using only one photon 
signature, the figure-of-merits in Table 5.4 were calculated. 
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Table 5.4: Results from photon back-streaming experiment used to couple photon 
and neutron experimental data together. 
 
Sample ζ  ( )ζσ  ( )3=− λf  ( )2=− λf  ( )1=− λf  
Aluminum 31.221 11.175 -2.304 8.871 20.046 
Chalk 18.797 8.671 -7.216 1.455 10.126 
Polyethylene 744.52 54.572 580.81 635.38 689.95 
Rubber 0.653 1.616 -4.196 -2.579 -0.963 
Sand 54.597 14.778 10.263 25.041 39.819 
Water 413.79 40.684 291.74 332.11 373.11 
Air (Empty) 215.87 29.385 127.71 157.10 186.49 
   ( )3=+ λf  ( )2=+ λf  ( )1=+ λf  
FertA 7.678 5.542 24.303 18.762 13.220 
FertB 14.542 7.627 37.422 29.796 22.169 
 
The results of this photon back-streaming experiment alone are not very desirable.  It is 
evident that placing a windshield in front of the aluminum box to help simulate a car 
affected the overall results.  However, this one particular photon signature does contain 
useful information about the target.  Thus, one would expect the results to improve when 
coupling the photon and neutron experimental data together. 
Next, the neutron experiment will be discussed.  The experiment used seven 
overall neutron signatures.  Using the detector responses from both bare and  cadmium-
covered europium doped lithium iodide (LiI(Eu)) neutron detectors and five signatures 
coming from neutron generated gamma-ray responses collected by a 20% efficient high 
purity germanium detector due to the 0.871-MeV nitrogen capture gamma ray, the 2.223-
MeV hydrogen capture gamma ray, the 4.438-MeV inelastic-scatter gamma ray from 
carbon, the 4.945-MeV carbon capture gamma ray, and the 5.105-MeV nitrogen 
inelastic-scatter gamma ray, respectively, the results in Table 5.5 were generated.  Some 
signatures are more useful than others; this is particularly true when doing neutron 
interrogation.  Thus, when more than one signature is used during the analysis, the results 
are optimized by using weight factors to weight the signatures.  For this particular 
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experiment, the hydrogen capture gamma-ray signature was weighted the highest 
( 375.04 = )α , the cadmium-filtered neutron signature and the oxygen capture gamma-ray 
signature were weighted slightly less ( )2.032 == αα ,  the carbon 4.438-MeV signature 
was next with a weight of 0875.05 =α , the three remaining signatures were given small 
weights of 0125.0761 === ααα .   The weight factors were determined using a brute-
force search over various permutations of weight factor values.  This is achieved by 
holding all weight factors constant except for one signature, and then adjusting that one 
weight factor in 0.01 increments to see how the results are affected.  Next, a different 
weight factor for another signature is adjusted while the remainder of the weight factors 
are held constant to see how that particular signature affects the results and so on and so 
forth.  
Table 5.5:  Results from neutron back-streaming experiment used to couple photon 
and neutron experimental data together. 
 
Sample ζ  ( )ζσ  ( )3=− λf  ( )2=− λf  ( )1=− λf  
Aluminum 230.68 15.879 183.05 198.92 214.80 
Chalk 211.32 15.269 165.51 180.78 196.05 
Polyethylene 375.30 23.549 304.65 328.20 351.75 
Rubber 355.34 17.711 302.21 319.92 337.63 
Sand 407.71 19.943 347.88 367.82 387.77 
Water 631.92 30.206 541.30 571.51 601.71 
Air (Empty) 85.407 7.648 62.462 70.111 77.759 
   ( )3=+ λf  ( )2=+ λf  ( )1=+ λf  
FertA 4.004 1.972 9.919 7.948 5.976 
FertB 9.107 2.938 17.922 14.983 12.045 
 
 
The results using neutron interrogation alone are quite good.  Using seven neutron 
signatures, one can discriminate both explosive surrogates from all seven inert materials 
at the 99% confidence level.  However, the purpose of this exercise is to show that adding 
one or more photon signatures to the seven neutron signatures improves the overall 
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results.  Using one photon signature and seven neutron signatures from both photon and 
neutron interrogation, we obtained the figure-of-merit metrics shown in Table 5.6.  Since 
more than one signature was used to calculate the overall figure-of-merit, weight factors 
were again used to optimize the results.  The hydrogen capture gamma-ray signature was 
weighted the highest ( 5 0.3α =
0.2
), the photon backscattered signature, the cadmium-filtered 
neutron signature, and the oxygen capture gamma-ray signatures were weighted slightly 
less ( 1 3 4α α α= =
0.07
= ), the carbon 4.438-MeV signature was given a weight of 
6α = , and the remaining signatures were given small weights ( 2 7 8 0.01α α α= = = ).   
Table 5.6:  Results from combining one photon and seven neutron signatures 
together using identical experimental setups. 
 
Sample ζ σ(ζ) ( )3=− λf  
Aluminum 190.79 12.90 152.10 
Chalk 172.81 12.34 135.80 
Polyethylene 449.14 21.77 383.83 
Rubber 284.41 14.17 241.89 
Sand 337.08 16.23 288.41 
Water 588.29 25.50 511.80 
Air (Empty) 111.50 8.484 86.048 
 ζ σ(ζ) ( )3=+ λf  
FertA 4.74 1.93 10.52 
FertB 10.19 2.80 18.60 
 
The results from the neutron interrogation alone were improved [19].  While some of the 
inert figure-of-merit values got smaller by combining photon and neutron interrogation, 
the difference between the smallest inert figure-of-merit value and the largest figure-of-
merit value for an explosive surrogate got larger.  Using a cut-off value of 0 25f =  
differentiates all fertilizer samples from all of the inert samples with 99% confidence.  
This initial trial of combining photon and neutron interrogation provides very 
encouraging results and future experimentation will hopefully prove this combination to 
dramatically improve the effectiveness of the SBRS method. 
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CHAPTER 6 - Conclusions 
A signature-based radiation scanning approach using a template-matching 
analysis procedure to detect IEDs has been illustrated.  Several photon back-streaming 
experiments have been described and the results have been promising.  Using only a 
single photon signature, it is possible to discriminate almost all inert samples from 
explosive surrogates with 68% confidence.  However, the sources used were not efficient 
at producing PIPAR, which may provide another photon-interrogation signature.  It was 
shown that coupling neutron experimental results with photon interrogation results can 
improve the overall figure-of-merit results and the effectiveness of this approach.  The 
results portrayed in this research demonstrate that photon interrogation can be used as 
part of a multidimensional approach to detect IEDs.   
The SBRS approach has several advantages over other active interrogation 
methods.  The method has the ability to be simple, rapid, robust, and operated at remote 
standoff distances.  Changing the amount or placement of a material within a specific 
geometric configuration (clutter) will cause different responses to be produced.  The 
SBRS technology can deal with this nonlinear effect due to clutter by investigating many 
different signatures and storing these templates that various clutter configurations 
produce.   
6.1  Future Work 
The SBRS approach used in an effort to detect hidden explosives, more 
importantly IEDs, looks very promising.  However, much additional work is needed in 
order to make this method feasible enough to be used in the field.  As mentioned before, 
the more signatures that can be used in this approach, the more effective and robust it will 
be.  The sources used in photon back-streaming experiments to date are not efficient at 
producing PIPAR.  In order for PIPAR to be produced, pair-production must occur.  As 
mentioned before, pair-production occurs only when the incident gamma-ray photon has 
an energy of 1.022 MeV or greater.  The cross-section for pair-production increases with 
gamma-ray energy, making a high-energy photon source essential for enough PIPAR to 
be produced to use it as an additional signature.   
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A 5-MeV betatron has been purchased and is currently being investigated.  The 
betatron is a particle accelerator producing a Bremmstralung spectrum of photons with 
maximum energy of 5 MeV.  Using a betatron has its advantages.  It produces very high-
energy photons and it does so with much greater intensity than the radioactive sources 
previously used.  This results in a much smaller irradiation time which in turn produces 
faster results.  Several studies have been done with the betatron and there are some issues 
that need to be addressed before this machine can be used as an effective source for 
future experimentation.   
Future work is being planned to see how many different signatures need to be 
investigated and how many different explosive templates must be stored for this method 
to be robust enough to be used in the field.  Thus, much work must be done in the future 
to produce the library of templates that must be created in order for this method to be 
successful.  More experimentation is also being planned so more photon and neutron 
interrogation results can be combined in hopes of improving the overall effectiveness of 
the SBRS method, making it one step closer to a working laboratory prototype. 
6.2  Recommendations 
While performing my research over the past several months, several issues were 
encountered during experimentation.  The following are a few proposed 
recommendations that will assist future researchers in this field of study.  First, when 
using radioactive sources as the form of gamma-ray photons for experimentation, it is 
recommended to construct shielding and collimation that ensures that the source is placed 
in the same location each time.  The smallest misplacement of the source can lead to 
several problems with the experimental data; more importantly the data may not be 
repeatable.  Second, it is very important to fully understand the detection system being 
used during experimentation.  During experimentation, a NaI(Tl) scintillation detector 
coupled with a UniSpec serving as the multichannel analyzer was used.  Several studies 
were done before it was realized that the NaI(Tl) crystal is temperature dependent and a 
change of five to ten degrees can shift the calibration by several channels.  Before starting 
any new experiments, it is crucial to always check the detection system to make sure 
everything is working properly and is consistent with previous experiments, i.e. 
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thoroughly check the detector calibration.  Lastly, with a high-energy machine photon 
source being used for future photon back-streaming experiments, the use of a different 
photon detector is recommended.  The NaI(Tl) scintillation detector currently being used 
is very susceptible to the high electromagnetic fields (EMF) emitted by particle 
accelerators.  The high EMF causes a cascade of electrons in the photomultiplier tube of a 
scintillation detector resulting in very high detector dead times and ultimately an 
inefficient detector.  Studies are currently being done to see if a large proportional 
counter can be used with a high-energy photon machine source and still provide the 
spectrum of back-streamed photons required for proper data analysis.   
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Appendix A - Detector Calibration Settings 
Calibration Name: UNI1500 
Calibration Equation:  Energy = -28.26 + 1.494*channel + 0.00001632*channel2 
MCA Settings: 
  ADC:  LLD = 0.89%, ULD = 100.19%, Noise = 28.24% 
  Stabilizer:  Gain Centroid = 70 channel, Gain Mode: off 
  Amplifier:  Fine Gain = 1.0851x 
  HVPS:  Voltage = 875.0 volts, Polarity = positive 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 42
Appendix B - Laboratory Photo 
 
Figure B.1: Photo of experimental setup in SBD Laboratory 
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Appendix C- Response Tables 
Table C.1:  Responses from photon back-streaming experiment 1 
Sample Response Standard Deviation 
FertAB 654778 809.2 
FertA 657008 810.6 
FertB 654417 809.0 
Aluminum 661672 813.4 
Chalk 658898 811.7 
Polyethylene 666814 816.6 
Rubber 652180 807.6 
Sand 662257 813.8 
Water 658893 811.7 
Air (Empty) 631099 794.4 
 
Table C.2:  Responses from photon back-streaming experiment 2 
Sample Response Standard Deviation 
FertAB 2494627 1579.4 
FertA 2496128 1579.9 
FertB 2496014 1579.9 
Aluminum 2503322 1582.2 
Chalk 2484473 1576.2 
Polyethylene 2492731 1578.8 
Rubber 2477666 1574.1 
Sand 2505005 1582.7 
Water 2502361 1581.9 
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Table C.3:  Responses from photon back-streaming experiment 3 
Sample Response Standard Deviation 
FertAB 2699955 1643.2 
FertA 2700005 1643.2 
FertB 2699737 1643.1 
Ammonium Nitrate 2698761 1642.8 
Aluminum 2702243 1643.9 
Chalk 2702724 1644.0 
Polyethylene 2697158 1642.3 
Rubber 2693128 1641.1 
Sand 2711329 1646.6 
Water 2703070 1644.1 
Air (Empty) 2680018 1637.1 
 
Table C.4:  Responses from photon back-streaming experiment used to couple 
photon and neutron experimental data together.  
 
Sample Response Standard Deviation 
FertAB 1280962 1131.8 
FertA 1285401 1133.8 
FertB 1287073 1134.5 
Aluminum 1289921 1135.7 
Chalk 1287911 1134.9 
Polyethylene 1325010 1151.1 
Rubber 1252256 1132.4 
Sand 1292816 1137.0 
Water 1313729 1146.2 
Air (Empty) 1257553 1121.4 
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Table C.5:  First neutron response (bare neutron detector) from neutron back-
streaming experiment used to couple photon and neutron experimental data 
together. 
 
Sample Response Standard Deviation 
FertAB 337237 580.7 
FertA 333335 577.4 
FertB 341938 584.8 
Polyethylene 354355 595.3 
Rubber 397901 630.8 
Water 313774 560.2 
Sand 378537 615.3 
Aluminum 341670 584.5 
Chalk 357442 597.9 
Air (Empty) 299308 547.1 
 
Table C.6:  Second neutron response (cadmium-covered neutron detector) from 
neutron back-streaming experiment used to couple photon and neutron 
experimental data together. 
 
Sample Response Standard Deviation 
FertAB 42191 205.4 
FertA 42262 205.6 
FertB 43856 209.4 
Polyethylene 42143 205.3 
Rubber 51969 228.0 
Water 38906 197.2 
Sand 53570 231.5 
Aluminum 50345 224.4 
Chalk 49484 222.4 
Air (Empty) 37918 194.7 
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Table C.7:  Third neutron response (0.871-MeV nitrogen capture gamma ray) from 
neutron back-streaming experiment used to couple photon and neutron 
experimental data together. 
 
Sample Response Standard Deviation 
FertAB 6187 1183.3 
FertA 10119.6 37.1 
FertB 5147.8 454.0 
Polyethylene 4698.3 1229.3 
Rubber 2337.7 37.2 
Water 0.0 0.0 
Sand 5010.3 1160.2 
Aluminum 0.0 0.0 
Chalk 5611.9 1110.1 
Air (Empty) 6630.9 1081.7 
 
 
Table C.8:  Fourth neutron response (2.223-MeV hydrogen capture gamma ray) 
from neutron back-streaming experiment used to couple photon and neutron 
experimental data together. 
 
Sample Response Standard Deviation 
FertAB 7713.0 153.2 
FertA 7427.8 148.8 
FertB 7881.9 168.4 
Polyethylene 15299.0 187.0 
Rubber 10649.7 257.6 
Water 16949.5 177.7 
Sand 5615.6 139.3 
Aluminum 5514.2 134.0 
Chalk 5513.8 87.3 
Air (Empty) 7627.4 240.4 
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Table C.9:  Fifth neutron response (4.438-MeV inelastic-scatter gamma ray from 
carbon) from neutron back-streaming experiment used to couple photon and 
neutron experimental data together. 
 
Sample Response Standard Deviation 
FertAB 396.2 100.1 
FertA 600.0 55.9 
FertB 645.9 121.1 
Polyethylene 784.0 128.4 
Rubber 40.5 193.4 
Water 404.3 98.6 
Sand 988.6 122.3 
Aluminum 474.7 41.4 
Chalk 727.7 97.5 
Air (Empty) 486.0 51.8 
 
 
Table C.10:  Sixth neutron response (4.945-MeV carbon capture gamma ray) from 
neutron back-streaming experiment used to couple photon and neutron 
experimental data together. 
 
Sample Response Standard Deviation 
FertAB 291.4 194.1 
FertA 268.1 139.1 
FertB 841.6 196.6 
Polyethylene 532.0 38.6 
Rubber 552.8 42.4 
Water 441.4 35.9 
Sand 770.2 46.9 
Aluminum 468.4 35.3 
Chalk 532.4 37.5 
Air (Empty) 145.7 139.4 
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Table C.11:  Seventh neutron response (5.105-MeV nitrogen inelastic-scatter 
gamma ray) from neutron back-streaming experiment used to couple photon and 
neutron experimental data together. 
 
Sample Response Standard Deviation 
FertAB 205.4 98.8 
FertA 255.0 102.4 
FertB 208.5 92.0 
Polyethylene 46.1 105.9 
Rubber 0.0 0.0 
Water 0.0 0.0 
Sand 0.0 0.0 
Aluminum 0.0 0.0 
Chalk 68.7 106.9 
Air (Empty) 0.0 0.0 
 
